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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHESTER E. FARROW, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION, 
a corporation, SALT LAKE CLINIC, 
a professional corporation, 
LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. and 
LOUIS G. MOENCH, M.D. 
Defendants and Respondents.: 
-----------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action for personal 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff after he jumped from his 
hospital window. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Health Services Corporation after the plaintiff failed to submit 
affidavits from his expert witnesses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment 
below. 
-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This respondent finds it necessary to make a complete 
statement of facts because (1) there are numerous misstatements 
of the record found in the appellant's brief and (2) the 
appellant has taken portions of his statement of facts from the 
testimony of witnesses at trial, whereas such testimony was not 
before the court at the time it granted the summary judgment 
herein questioned. The statement of facts contained in this 
brief will refer only to those facts presented to the court by 
way of submissions of the parties prior to trial. 
The Complaint and History 
The hospital chart shows that Mr. Farrow was admitted 
to the LDS Hospital on August 12, 1974, with a primary diagnosis 
of cervical spondylosis and a herniated cervical disc (Exhibit~ 
1, cover sheet). His history upon admission shows that he had 
hit his left arm on a projecting mirror from his Blazer vehicle, 
causing considerable pain (Exhibit D-1, P. 195A). The plaintiff 
was not being admitted to the hospital for psychiatric, emotional 
or mental reasons. 
-2-
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Early Post-Surgical Events 
The summary in the hospital record prepared by the 
treating physician, L. J. Schricker, M.D., indicates that on 
August 15, 1974, Mr. Farrow had performed on him a cervical 
laminectomy in an operating room at the LOS Hospital (Exhibit o-
1, P. 195B). 
It was noted that on or about the third post-operative 
day Mr. Farrow evidenced some withdrawal and irritability 
(Exhibit D-1, P. 195B). A social worker from the hospital was 
called in. 
The progress notes of the social worker, Kent 
Griffiths, dated August 20 (Exhibit D-1, P. 87), reveal that on 
that date he had a long discussion with the plaintiff concerning 
his personal and marital difficulties. Mr. Griffiths stated, 
"His confusion seems to revolve around the lack of any consistent 
meaning to the significant relationships in his life. He loves 
his family dearly but is unable to express those feelings to them 
and is often suppressed by his wife when he tries to talk to 
her." 
The progress note of August 22 of Dr. Schricker 
(Exhibit D-1, P. 87) states, "Much clearer! Doing well. 
Ambulating well." 
The progress note of Kent Griffiths, the social worker, 
of August 22 (Exhibit o-1, P. 88) shows that Mr. Griffiths 
discussed the family problems with the plaintiff's wife. 
According to Mr. Griffiths: 
-3-
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There definitely are and have been for 
years problems in this marriage that 
need psychiatric if not other forms of 
counseling. There seems to have been 
little give-and-take and this has 
affected not only the marriage but the 
children as well. Feelings of jealousy, 
inadequacy, resentment, fear, and 
withdrawal have been expressed. Will 
continue. 
The Morning of August 23 
On August 23, 1974, Dr. Schricker noted that the 
plaintiff asked for psychiatric help on that day for the first 
time. Neurologically he was doing quite well. Dr. Schricker 
noted that the plaintiff was "clear and well oriented, seems 
happier today" (Exhibit D-1, P. 88). 
The Evening of August 23 
Dr. Moench, the psychiatrist, visited the patient in 
his room between about 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on August 23, 1974. At 
about 8:00 p.m. Dr. Moench prepared a report of consulation 
(Exhibit D-1, P. 68-69) and ordered a change in medication 
(Exhibit D-1, P. 488). 
Nurse LaRona Callahan, who was on duty on the 
neurosurgical ward on the afternoon shift of August 23, 1974, 
reports that following Dr. Moench's visit that evening, Mr. 
Farrow rested quietly. He talked quite rationally and responded 
well to Nurse Callahan's conversations (Affidavit of LaRona 
Callahan, paragraph 15, R. 220). 
Further details concerning the care given by nursing 
personnel to Mr. Farrow on the evening of August 23, 1974, and 
-4-
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the early morning of August 24, 1974, are summarized beginning at 
page 8 of this brief. 
The Early Morning of August 24 
At about 2:40 a.m. on August 24, 1974, the nurses on 
duty heard a loud crash from glass breaking. Upon entering the 
plaintiff's room they noted that the window was broken and that 
Mr. Farrow was gone (Exhibit D-1, P. 88-89). 
The plaintiff had jumped from the window in his sixth 
floor room and had landed on his back on a roof at the second 
floor level (Deposition of Chester E. Farrow, R. 2055-56). 
Evidence that Jump Was a Suicide Attempt 
The hospital records reveal that at 3:25 a.m. Dr. 
Schricker arrived. His progress notes read as follows: 
At time I arrived at 0325 patient was on the 
roof at second floor level over the p.t. 
entrance. I went out to him and found him 
covered with blankets, head sandbagged and 
lying as he had landed. Depression in the 
roof. Patient alert and conscious. I asked 
why he did such a thing and he replied that 
life was not worth fighting for, that he had 
wanted to die for many months and this seemed 
like a good time to do it. 
(Exhibit D-1, P. 89). 
Later during the day of August 24, 1974, the plaintiff 
was visited by the psychiatrist, Dr. Moench. Dr. Moench reports, 
"He says he was not thinking of this act at the time I visited 
him last night, that he made the decision just before" (Exhibit 
D-1, P. 91). 
It was the plaintiff's contention that he did not 
-s-
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attempt to commit suicide, but that he was led to jump because of 
certain "voices". We conceded for purposes of the motion for 
summary judgment that it was probably not possible to determine 
with certainty whether the plaintiff jumped because he intended 
to commit suicide or whether, as he claims, he jumped to escape 
"voices". 
Nonetheless, the respondent, Health Services 
Corporation, urged that it was entitled to summary judgment 
because there was no genuine issue that any of the alleged 
defects in nursing care was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
jump, regardless of his motivations or intentions in jumping. 
The Affidavits of Respondent's Expert Witnesses 
This respondent had submitted to the court below the 
affidavits of three medical experts on the issues of compliance 
with the standard of care and the causal relationship between the 
nursing care and the plaintiff's jump. These medical experts a~ 
Dr. Charles R. Smart (R. 230-32), Dr. Bruce Alexander Walter (R. 
293-320), and Sister M. Caroli ta Hart (R. 234-237). Dr. Charles 
R. Smart is the Chief of Surgery of the LOS Hospital. Sister M. 
Carolita Hart is a nursing expert who has received an M.S. in 
nursing from the Catholic University of America and who has been 
associated with the Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City and 
with the Northwest Family Health Center in Salt Lake City where 
she was serving as a family nurse practitioner. Dr. Bruce 
Alexander Walter was the Deputy Director of Health for Medical 
Services for the State of Utah. 
-6-
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The affidavits of Dr. Charles Smart and Sister M. 
carolita Hart were based upon a thorough review of the care and 
treatment received by the plaintiff during the afternoon and 
evening of August 23, 1974, and the early morning hours of August 
24, 1974. Such information was gathered from the hospital 
records, the affidavits of the nurses on duty, also filed with 
the court below, and the depositions taken in this action. 
In summary, these experts found no deficiencies in the 
care and treatment rendered by the hospital in the following 
areas: 
1. The frequency and content of the nursing 
care (Hart affidavit, paragraph 6a, R. 235; 
Smart affidavit, paragraph 6, R. 231). 
2. The decision not to apply physical 
restraints (Hart affidavit, paragraph 6c, R. 
236; Smart affidavit, paragraph 7, R. 231; 
Walter affidavit, paragraph 10, R. 295). 
3. The staffing of the neurosurgical ward 
(Hart affidavit, paragraph 6d, R. 236; Walter 
affidavit, paragraph Ba, R. 294). 
4. The determination that the plaintiff was 
asleep (Smart affidavit, paragraph B, R. 
231). 
5. The administering of drugs to the patient 
by Karen Pool (Walter affidavit, paragraph 
Bb, R. 294). 
6 The lack of numbers on some of the pages 
of the hospital record (Walter affidavit, 
paragraph Be, R. 295). 
It was further the opinion of Dr. Smart that there was 
no causal connection between the nursing care given to the 
f h's window (Affidavit of plaintiff and the plaintiff's jump rom l 
lo R 232) Si'milarly, Sister Charles R. Smart, paragraphs 9- , • • 
-7-
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Hart stated that any lacking in the areas of frequency of nursing 
contacts or the staffing of nurses were not causes or 
contributing factors in the plaintiff's jump (Affidavit of Sist~ 
M. Carolila Hart, paragraph 6f, R. 237). Likewise, Dr. Walter 
stated that any delay in administering Mellaril was not a 
contributing factor in the plaintiff's decision to jump from his 
window (Affidavit of Bruce Alexander Walter, paragraph 9, R. 
29 5). 
The plaintiff submitted no affidavits from expert 
medical witnesses to controvert the expert opinions rendered by 
these three highly-qualified individuals. 
Chronology of Events of August 23 and 24 
The following pages record in chronological order the 
care and treatment received by Mr. Farrow on the evening and 
night in question. In order to aid the Court in identifying the 
hospital employees involved, the following list is provided. 
Karen Pool - R.N., afternoon shift charge nurse 
LaRona Callahan - L.P.N., afternoon shift 
Fern L. Peterson - Nurse's aide, afternoon shift 
Agnes Diane Karren - R.N., night shift charge nurse 
Judith Hall - L.P.N., night shift 
Cathy Hughes - L.P.N., night shift in intensive care 
Kent Griffiths - Social worker 
A diagram of the chronology of events concerning the 
care of the plaintiff has been prepared and is attached to the 
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brief as an appendix. However, for the sake of clarity, a more 
complete chronology of events will now be given. 
The afternoon of August 23. On August 23, at 4:00 
p.m., Nurse Callahan took the vital signs of the plaintiff in his 
room (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 7, R. 219). 
Nurse Callahan states that on August 23, sometime 
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., the plaintiff should have received 
drinking water if the usual routine procedure were followed 
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 9, R. 219). 
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 5:00 and 
7:00 p.m., the social worker, Kent Griffiths, talked to the 
plaintiff for about an hour on the patio of the hospital. Mr. 
Griffiths noted that the plaintiff seemed more oriented than 
during previous meetings with him. Following their conversation, 
the plaintiff returned to his room. 
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 5:00 and 
7:00 p.m., the plaintiff would have had his evening meal taken to 
him under the routine procedures. Later, the empty tray would 
have been picked up. Nurse Callahan notes from the chart that 
the plaintiff had a general diet for dinner and ate his food well 
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 10, R. 219). 
The evening of August 23. On August 23 at about 7:30 
p.m., the plaintiff would have received drinking water according 
to routine practice (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 11, 
R. 219). 
On August 23 at about 7:00 p.m., Dr. Moench, the 
psychiatrist, made a special trip to the hospital to visit the 
-9-
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plaintiff at the request of Dr. Schricker (Deposition of Louis G, 
Moench, R. 2131). He finished his visit with the plaintiff 
sometime after 8:00 p.m. (Deposition of Louis G. Moench, R. 
2147). During the visit the plaintiff related to Dr. Moench the 
problems with his work and his wife's dissatisfaction with his 
income. Following the visit, Dr. Moench made a "Report of 
Consultation" (Exhibit D-1, P. 68-69) wherein Dr. Moench 
suggested changes in medications and repeated reassurances by 
direct nurse contact. Dr. Moench ordered 100 mg. of the drug 
"Mellaril" "stat" and 50 mg. "q.i.d. and p.r.n." (Exhibit D-1, P, 
488). 
Shortly after Dr. Moench's visit with the plaintiff, 
Karen Pool read the consultation report and had a conversation 
with Dr. Moench concerning its contents. Nurse Pool also talk~ 
with Nurses Callahan and Peterson, who were on shift with her, 
about the situation (Deposition of Karen Pool, R. 1026-28). 
On August 23 at 8:00 p.m., Nurse Callahan took the 
vital signs of the plaintiff (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, 
paragraph 12, R. 219-20). 
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 9:00 p.m. 
and 11:00 p.m., Nurse Callahan administered what is called "H.S. 
Care" to the plaintiff. She remembers that following Dr. 
Moench's visit, the plaintiff was resting quietly. When she 
entered the plaintiff's room to administer the H.S. Care, he 
appeared to be quiet and well oriented. She asked him if he 
wanted a back rub and he accepted. Also at that time she 
straightened up his bed, cleaned his room and talked to him for a 
-10-
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while, mostly about his little girl and his plans of going home 
soon. Mr. Farrow engaged in the conversation in a rational 
manner. It may also be at this time that Nurse Callahan and the 
plaintiff talked about how beautiful the city was at night when 
the lights of the city were shining. It is also possible that 
Nurse Callahan would have made more than one visit to the 
plaintiff's room in order to complete the H.S. Care (Affidavit of 
LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 14-16, R. 220-21). 
On August 23, at about 10:00 p.m., Nurse Pool 
administered 100 mg. of Mellaril to the plaintiff. At that time 
she asked the plaintiff how he was feeling, and he stated that he 
felt much better after having talked to Dr. Moench. Nurse Pool 
asked the plaintiff if he wanted some medication and if there was 
anything that she could do for him (Deposition of Karen Pool, R. 
1028-29). 
On August 23, at about 11:00 p.m., before the end of 
the afternoon shift, the plaintiff would have been checked again 
according to routine procedure. (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, 
paragraph 17, R. 221). 
On August 23 between 11:00 and 11:45 p.m., Karen Pool, 
the charge nurse of the afternoon shift, gave her report to the 
nurses coming to work for the night shift. During this report 
she talked to Nurses Karren and Hall about (1) Dr. Moench's 
request for the nurses to observe the plaintiff, (2) the 
plaintiff being allowed up and around because of the length of 
the time since his back surgery, (3) the new medication orders 
that Dr. Moench had given and (4) that the plaintiff had been 
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quiet, calm and resting and that he had shown no signs of 
problems since Dr. Moench's visit (Affidavit of Agnes Diane 
Karren, paragraph 6, R. 224-25; Affidavit of Karen Pool, 
paragraph 8, R. 216; Deposition of Diane Karren, R. 1057). 
The Early Morning of August 24. At about midnight on 
August 24, Nurse Hall visited the plaintiff in his room. 
Although Nurse Hall cannot recall all of the details of the 
conversation, she does remember that she asked if there was 
anything that he needed. He replied that there was not and that 
he was alright. She made sure that he understood how to call the 
nurse with his call light if he should need to and told him to be 
sure to call her if there was anything he needed. He replied 
that he would (Affidavit of Judith Vanet Hall, paragraph 6, R. 
228). 
On August 24, sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m., 
Nurse Karren opened the plaintiff's door and looked in. The room 
was dark and she could see a form on the bed. The room was 
quiet. The plaintiff did not say anything to her and she said 
nothing to him for fear of waking him. He appeared to be still. 
She then closed the door and left the room. She believes that 
she may have had more than one contact with the plaintiff, but 
this is the only contact that she can remember having had with 
the plaintiff during the night shift of August 23-24 (Affidavit 
of Agnes Diane Karren, paragraph 7, R. 225). 
At about 2:40 a.m. on August 24, the plaintiff jumped 
from his window. 
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Other General Observations by the Nurses 
The foregoing are the events that the hospital 
employees can point to with some degree of certainty as to time, 
either because of memory of the event, knowledge of routine 
procedures, or entries in the medical chart. In addition to 
these, Nurses Pool, Callahan and Peterson can remember other 
items of a general nature which reflect upon their care and 
observation of the plaintiff. 
Nurse Karen Pool can remember "several contacts" that 
she had with Mr. Farrow during the shift. Although she does not 
recall the conversations, she does recall that the plaintiff was 
calm, quiet and rational. He did not do or say anything to 
indicate that he was hearing voices or felt presences in his room 
or that he was suffering from hallucinations (Affidavit of Karen 
Pool, paragraph 7, R. 216). 
Nurse LaRona Callahan states that she has a definite 
recollection of contacts that she and other nurses had with the 
plaintiff during the afternoon shift. She notes that not all of 
the contacts that a nurse has with a patient are charted 
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 5-6, R. 218-19). It is 
Nurse Callahan's opinion that she personally visited the 
plaintiff at least once an hour during the afternoon shift and 
that he would have been visited as frequently as every half-hour 
during the shift by her or some other nurse (Affidavit of LaRona 
Callahan, paragraph 18, R. 221). Although Nurse Callahan cannot 
remember the details of all of the conversations she had with the 
plaintiff, she does remember that the conversations centered 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
around the plaintiff's plans to leave the hospital and his little 
girl. Such conversations appeared to make the plaintiff feel 
better (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 19, R. 221). It 
was Nurse Callahan's observations that Farrow was well oriented, 
coherent, calm and relaxed. He did not tell her of any 
happenings that would indicate to her that he was suffering from 
hallucinations. He did not mention voices, appearances or people 
in his room (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 20-21, R, 
221-22). 
Fern Peterson says that she talked with Farrow on 
nnumerous occasions" during the afternoon shift. Her best 
estimate is that she conversed with him "four or five times" 
during the afternoon shift. She did not perform any medical 
tests or procedures but was simply there to help carry out Dr. 
Moench' s suggestions. The plaintiff did not say anything to Fern 
Peterson about voices or presences in his room (Affidavit of Fern 
Peterson, paragraphs 5-7, R. 210). 
Objections to the Appellant's Statement of Facts 
1. The first 13 pages of the appellant's statement cl 
facts is a summary of the testimony of the plaintiff at trial. 
Although the Court might properly consider this record on the 
appeals against Moench and Salt Lake Clinic, such testimony is 
not part of the record for purposes of the appeals concerning the 
Health Services Corporation and Dr. Schricker. 
2. Objection is made to the summary of the progress 
notes and nurses notes found at pages 15 through 19 of the 
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appellant's brief because the summary is incomplete, inter-
pretive, and filled with transcription errors. As an example, 
the appellant leaves out the progress note of the social worker, 
Kent Griffiths, which shows that the request for a psychiatric 
consultation relates to the plaintiff's marital problems. It is 
suggested that the Court should consult the hospital records 
directly. 
3. The appellant states that the term "stat" means 
"right now", without giving any authority for the use of that 
term generally or as used by Dr. Moench. In his deposition, Dr. 
Moench clearly stated that the term "stat" can mean either 
"immediately" or "now rather than tomorrow" (Deposition of Louis 
G. Moench, R. 2146). 
4. The appellant states that Dr. Moench ordered 
Mellaril "stat" at 8:00 p.m. and that Dr. Moench finished his 
work and left the hospital at 8:00 p.m. Neither statement 
contains a reference to the record. In fact, the record 
discloses that these events did not take place until after 8:00 
p.m. The written medication order does not indicate what time 
the order was given. It does show that the clerk, Schmidt, 
endorsed the order at 8:30 and that Nurse Pool signed the order 
at 8:50 (Exhibit D-1, P. 488). Dr. Moench states that he saw 
Farrow, finishing somewhere after 8:00 (Deposition of Louis G. 
Moench, R. 2147). Nurse Pool says that she talked to Dr. Moench 
after she had read his consultation report (Deposition of Karen 
Pool, R. 1027). 
5. The appellant attempts to show that the plaintiff 
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was given only a 50 mg. dose of Mellaril at 10:00 p.m. rather 
than a 100 mg. dose. The implication is that Craig Jackson, a 
pharmacist at the hospital, filled the order with 50 mg. tablets. 
In fact, Craig Jackson states in his deposition that there are 
two professionally acceptable methods of filling the order. One 
would have been to send a 100 mg. tablet and a supply of 50 mg, 
tablets. Another method would be to send all 50 mg. tablets 
(Deposition of Craig Jackson, R. 970-71). 
6. The appellant states that Karen Pool gave no 
reasons for modifying her deposition. Such is not the case. See 
the record at pages 986-87. 
7. The appellant states that he was given Mellaril at 
10:00 p.m. and that he was to have 50 mg. at least every four 
hours thereafter. From this he concludes that he should have 
been given more Mellaril by 2:00 a.m. Apparently, the appellant 
is mistaken as to the meaning of the term "q.i.d.". Dr. Moench, 
in interpreting the medication order, stated that 50 mg. of 
Mellaril were to be given "for the subsequent day four times a 
day as needed" (Deposition of Louis G. Moench, R. 2145). The 
term "q.i.d." means four times a day rather than every four 
hours. 
8. The appellant states that Dr. Moench ordered 30 mg. 
of Dalmane at "bedtime and as needed". Such is not the case. 
Dr. Moench ordered Dalmane "at bedtime as necessary" (Deposition 
of Louis G. Moench, R. 2147). 
9. The appellant states that Nurse Pool visited his 
room only twice between 8:00 and 11:00 p.rn. However, her 
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affidavit states that she had "several contacts" with Mr. Farrow 
during the shift (Affidavit of Karen Pool, paragraph 7, R. 216), 
10. The appellant states that the L.P.N, on duty during 
the afternoon shift visited the plaintiff's room only twice. 
However, the affidavit of this nurse, LaRona Callahan, shows that 
in her opinion the plaintiff was visited by her at least once an 
hour and by someone as frequently as every half-hour (Affidavit 
of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 18, R. 221). 
11. The appellant states that there were only two 
nurses on duty during the night shift except for the personnel in 
the intensive care room who, he says, are not involved with 
patients on the floor. However, Cathy D. Hughes, one of the 
nurses on duty in the intensive care unit, stated that one of the 
nurses in the intensive care unit is available to help the nurses 
on the main neurosurgical ward if one is needed and if the nurses 
are not busy with patients in the intensive care unit. Nurse 
Hughes helped Nurses Hall and Karren in doing the work that was 
made necessary by the plaintiff's jump (Affidavit of Cathy D. 
Hughes, paragraphs 6-7, R. 213). 
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POINT I: 
ARGUMENT 
IN RULING UPON THE CORRECTNESS OF THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, THE COURT SHOULD EXAMINE ONLY THOSE 
MATTERS IN THE RECORD THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT 
BELOW WHEN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED 
Prior to trial, the respondents, Health Services 
Corporation and J. L. Schricker, moved for summary judgment on 
the ground that the plaintiff did not have the expert testimony 
needed to sustain his case at trial. This respondent supported 
its motion with an extensive memorandum and with affidavits of a 
nurses aide (Peterson), two licenses practical nu rs es (Hughes and 
Callahan), three registered nurses (Pool, Karren, and Hall), two 
expert medical doctors (Smart and Walter), and one nursing expert 
(Hart). The testimony found in these affidavits were from the 
hospital personnel directly involved with the plaintiff and froo 
experts in their respective fields who had made thorough 
examinations of the factual affidavits, the depositions and the 
hospital charts. 
In addition, the court had before it the depositions of 
defendant Moench, Nurse Pool, the plaintiff, Nurse Karren, Julie 
Hansen (medical records department, LOS Hospital), Sidney Walker, 
M.D., Mary E. Vaughn (plaintiff's expert) Francis Funk 
(plaintiff's expert), C. H. Hardin Branch, M.D. (plaintiff's 
expert), and Craig Jackson (hospital pharmacist). It was further 
stipulated that the hospital records be considered in the court's 
determination. The court also considered the pleadings and 
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answers to interrogatories on file. 
It is significant to note that the plaintiff did not 
submit any affidavits or other materials to be considered by the 
court in ruling upon the motions for summary judgment. Based 
upon this substantial record, the court below, after considerable 
deliberation, found from the submissions that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that this respondent 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This action continued to trial only for respondents 
Moench and Salt Lake Clinic. Numerous exhibits and voluminous 
testimony became a part of the record because of this trial. 
However, in examining the propriety of the summary 
judgments and in searching the record for genuine fact issues, 
this Court should examine only those materials that were before 
the court below when it granted the summary judgments. 
Otherwise, the summary judgment proceedings are of no value. 
Were it otherwise, a trial court would never grant a summary 
judgment because of the fear of reversal by an appellate court 
that could consider matters outside the record then existing, 
even if the plaintiff were unable to demonstrate that he could 
make a prima facie case against the defendant. 
This Court has already recognized generally that upon 
the review of a granting of a summary judgment, the Court will 
apply the same standard as that applied by the trial court. 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
A pertinent case is American Universal Insurance Co. v. 
Ranson, 59 wash. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962), wherein the court 
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stated that it would consider only the record before the trial 
court at the time the summary judgment was granted: 
In an appellate review of a summary 
judgment entered pursuant to Rule of 
Pleading, Practice and Procedure 56, RCW Vol. 
O, this court can review only those matters 
that have been presented to the trial court 
for its consideration before entry of the 
summary judgment. The reason is 
obvious: it would be unfair to consider, on 
appellate review, matters not presented to 
the trial court for its consideration. We 
must have before us the precise record - no 
more and no less - considered by the trial 
court. The court may consider, of course, 
those matters which it may notice judicially. 
370 P.2d at 870. 
Also in point are Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wash. 2d 880, 
441 P.2d 532 (1968), where the Supreme Court of Washington 
determined that it would not consider two depositions taken after 
the summary judgment was granted, and Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser 
~' 14 wash. App. 642, 544 P.2d 107 (1975), where the Court of 
Appeals of Washington refused to consider an affidavit from an 
expert witness that was filed with a motion for reconsideration 
of the summary judgment granted below because the affidavit was 
not a part of the record when the lower court granted the sum~ey 
judgment. 
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POINT II: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A HARSH REMEDY WHEN THE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PRESENT ADEQUATE TESTIMONY TO 
MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
This Court has long recognized that the summary 
judgment procedure, while not a substitute for the trial of 
genuine, material fact issues, is a very beneficial procedure to 
expedite the resolution of actions that are doomed to failure 
because of the lack of any genuine, material fact issue to 
present at trial. In Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974), 
this Court stated that it is not a harsh rule to tell a party 
that he is not entitled to recover as a matter of law when the 
facts are not in dispute. The Court dealt with the notion that 
the plaintiff might be able to find other facts to present at the 
time of trial, as follows: 
Who knows what evidence a party might 
produce if given the opportunity? In the 
light of the modern pratice under the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a trial is not to be by 
ambush. Instead, the evidence upon which one 
relies for judgment can be, and should be, 
known to the opponent1 and when all the 
evidence is known, if there is no dispute on 
any material issue of fact, the rules provide 
that the court may apply the law and thus 
terminate the matter, thereby conserving the 
time of the court and avoiding expense to the 
state and to the litigants. 
Gratuitous statements put in decisions 
to the effect that a summary judgment is a 
harsh remedy and should never be given if at 
trial a party might be able to produc7 
evidence which would reasonably sustain a 
judgment in his favor, tends to.cause trial 
judges to hesitate to grant motions for 
summary judgments in those case~ where there 
are no disputed issues of material facts. 
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The only harsh thing about summary judgments 
is for a trial judge to fail in his duty to 
apply the law and summarily decide a case 
when there is no disputed issue of material 
facts. 
525 P.2d at 621-22. 
To the same effect is 
Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 
( 1957), wherein this Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant based upon extensive pretrial discovery. 
Concerning the alleged hastiness of the summary judgment 
procedure, the Court stated: 
The first attack plaintiff makes upon 
the summary judgment is that the procedure is 
too hasty. He says that if the case had been 
allowed to come to trial in its regular turn 
on the calendar, he might have been able to 
produce another witness or witnesses. This 
contention is without merit. The accident 
happened over a year before the motion for 
summary judgment was entered. There was no 
reasonable assurance that the witness 
referred to, a resident of California, might 
be found within a reasonable time or at all, 
nor that his testimony would help the 
plaintiff if available. Speaking generally, 
it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff 
files his action he has sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate a right to recovery. All he 
is entitled to is a reasonable opportunity to 
marshal and present such evidence. 
318 P.2d at 341. The Court also ruled that a summary judgment 
does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to a jury trial. 
On the motion for summary judgment, this respondent 
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the 
plaintiff was unable to produce the expert testimony necessacy ~ 
prove his medical malpractice case. There are numerous cases of 
recent origin in this region where the courts have upheld the 
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granting of summary judgments in medical malpractice actions 
where the plaintiffs have failed to produce the requisite expert 
testimony. For example, in Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 
543 P.2d 1052 (1975), the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the 
granting of a summary judgment in a medical malpractice case 
where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they could 
produce expert medical testimony that indicated that the doctor's 
care fell below the appropriate standard of care. To the same 
effect is Abernethy v. Smith, 17 Ariz. App. 363, 498 P.2d 175 
(1972), where the court affirmed the summary judgment granted by 
the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs were unable to 
present any competent evidence to show that the defendants had 
deviated from the standard of practice. Likewise, in Morrell v. 
St. Luke's Medical Center, 27 Ariz. App. 486, 556 P.2d 334 
(1976), the court affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in 
a medical malpractice case where the plaintiff was unable to 
present even one expert witness to support his allegations of 
malpractice or to controvert the affidavits bolstering the 
defendants' summary judgment motions. 
The Supreme Court of Montana has made a similar ruling 
in Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 545 P.2d 670 (Mont. 
1976), a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a 
hospital. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of 
the hospital and doctors, noting that the plaintiffs had failed 
to present any evidence that would establish the applicable 
standard of care, that such a standard was departed from, and 
that a breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
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injury. 
Similar judgments have also come from Washington. In 
Shoberg v. Kelly, 1 Wash. App. 673, 463 P.2d 280 (1969), the 
court dismissed the appeal of a summary judgment in a medical 
malpractice action where the plaintiffs were unable to show that 
they had or would have medical expert testimony to prove the 
applicable standard of care and its violation. And in Swanson 
v. Brigham, 18 Wash. App. 647, 571 P.2d 217 (1977), the court 
affirmed the summary judgment entered in favor of a physician in 
a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff failed to 
present expert medical testimony that the physician's conduct 
violated the standard of professional practice. 
In the case of Mr. Farrow, his jump occurred in August 
of 1974. Yet in August of 1977, three years later, the plaintiff 
was still unable to produce competent expert medical testimony 
that the hospital had caused the injuries to the plaintiff by 
violating some applicable standard of care. Summary judgment wu 
properly granted. 
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POINT III: WHERE IT IS CLAIMED THAT A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE 
REALIZED THAT A PATIENT, WHO WAS NOT ADMITTED AS 
A MENTAL PATIENT, WAS A SUICIDE RISK, THE PLAINTIFF 
MUST PRODUCE EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO THE BREACH OF 
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE AND AS TO 
PROXIMATE CAUSATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A PRIMA 
FACIE CASE OF MALPRACTICE 
The appellant argues that expert testimony is not 
necessary to prove negligence and causation in this case. In so 
arguing, he makes references to cases wherein the patient was 
admitted with known mental disorders, psychiatric disorders, or 
suicidal tendencies. Many of the cases involved patients who 
were kept in psychiatric wards where the necessity of protecting 
the patient against himself was obvious. Such is not the case 
here. Dr. Moench, the psychiatrist, had visited the plaintiff 
only hours before his jump, and Dr. Moench did not consider the 
plaintiff a suicidal risk, nor did he order that the plaintiff be 
transferred to the psychiatric ward. The nurses had observed 
that the plaintiff was calm and rational that evening. 
In such a situation, the affirmative testimony of 
experts is necessary to make a prima facie case of malpractice 
against the hospital. A case in point is Dimitrijevic v. Chicago 
Wesley Memorial Hospital, 92 Ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 309 
(1968), a wrongful death action against a hospital and doctors 
for the death of a patient who had jumped from an unguarded 
window. The plaintiff sought to prove malpractice on the part of 
the defendants. The court, however, directed verdicts in favor 
of the defendants. The facts show that the deceden~ had been 
suffering from increasing depression and went to the hospital for 
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psychiatric treatment. He was put in a double room on the 
eleventh floor next to an unguarded window. His momements were 
not closely restrained and he was not constantly supervised, 
Doctor Blackman, upon admission of the patient, diagnosed the 
illness as an acute anxiety state and did not consider that the 
patient was a suicidal risk. The plaintiff claimed that the 
doctors should have been aware that the patient was a suicidal 
risk and that their failure to take the appropriate precautions 
was malpractice. 
stated: 
Concerning the necessity of expert testimony the court 
Plaintiff argues that in Kent v. 
Whitaker, 58 Wash.2d 569, 364 P.2d 556, and 
Stallman v. Robinson, 364 Mo. 275, 260 s.w. 
2d 743, the jury was allowed to pass on the 
adequacy of the care given patients who took 
their own lives while in the care of 
physicians without affirmative expert 
testimony of negligence. In those cases there 
was no question but that the patients were 
suicidal risks. The patients had made 
previous attempts on their lives, the 
defendants acknowledged the serious risk of 
suicide and took precautions. The jury was 
allowed to evaluate whether the patients were 
watched closely enough in view of their 
admittedly pronounced suicidal tendencies. 
In the instant case the question is much 
farther from the ken of the lay mind: were 
the symptoms of the decedent such that a 
reasonably skillful doctor using customary 
methods should have regarded decedent as a 
suicidal risk requiring special 
precautions? ••• 
We think that the question whether de-
fendant doctors failed to exercise ordinary 
skill and care in not characterizing decedent 
as a suicidal risk falls within the general 
rule requiring the affirmative testimony of 
experts •••• The diagnosis and treatment of 
plaintiff's decedent was neither so grossly 
unskilled nor so clearly within the common 
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experience of the jurors that it could go to 
the ~ury without affirmative expert 
testimony. 
236 N.E.2d at 313. Concerning the hospital's liability the court 
stated: 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence 
established a prima facie case of negligence 
against the hospital in that the hospital was 
negligent in having decedent next to an un-
guarded window and in not transferring him to 
section 8-W in accordance with Dr. Blackman's 
orde:·. We believe that unless the attending 
physician recommended special precautions 
against suicide the hospital was under no 
duty, in these circumstances, to take such 
precautions. The evidence is conclusive that 
the doctors neither felt such instructions 
necessary nor gave them. Dr. Brumlik 
prescribed that decedent remain ambulatory. 
Dr. Blackman was consulted by the hospital's 
administrator over the need for security 
precautions. The same is true regarding the 
hospital's failure to transfer the patient to 
8-W. It contacted Dr. Blackman who said that 
the transfer was not an emergency and could 
be delayed until there was regular space 
available. We believe the hospital had a 
right to rely on the instructions of the 
doctors and that the evidence does not 
support a prima facie case of hospital 
negligence. 
236 N.E.2d at 314. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff was not even a 
psychiatric patient. He was admitted for back surgery. Although 
some problems arose concerning disorientation and the plaintiff's 
unhappiness with his marriage, there was no indication that he 
was a suicidal risk. Only hours before the plaintiff's jump, Dr. 
Moench, the psychiatrist, evaluated the plaintiff but did not 
find it necessary to place him in physical restraints or to put 
him in a psychiatric ward, even though he recognized that the 
plaintiff was on the sixth floor in a room with an unguarded 
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window. Obviously, Dr. Moench did not consider the plaintiff to 
be a suicidal risk. If, as the Dimitrijevic court states, it is 
necessary to show by the affirmative testimony of experts that a 
doctor was negligent in not characterizing a patient as a 
suicidal risk, logic would seem to compel the necessity of 
affirmative expert testimony to show that a ~ should have 
substituted her judgment for that of the psychiatrist and 
recognized that the plaintiff, who had been resting calmly and 
quietly, was a suicidal risk. 
Another case in point is Lanczki v. Providence 
Hospital, 258 N.W.2d 238 (Mich. App. 1977), where the court 
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant, an 
orthopedic surgeon. The record disclosed that the plaintiff h~ 
been admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of a ruptured 
disc, and two days later the defendant performed a laminectomy 
upon the plaintiff. On the first day after the operation the 
plaintiff was allowed to be ambulatory. On the morning of August 
4, the defendant learned from the plaintiff that he had 
experienced a bad night and had not slept well. The plaintiff 
told him, however, that he now felt fine and would like to go 
home. The defendant authorized the plaintiff's discharge. After 
speaking to the doctor, the plaintiff packed his suitcase, 
started to get dressed and shortly thereafter jumped from the 
window of his room. Nursing notes indicated that on the previo~ 
evening the plaintiff was hearing noises of the defendant and the 
patient's wife and had appeared to be very nervous and 
apprehensive. But on the morning of the discharge he appear~ 
-28-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oriented, quiet and cooperative, and was speaking rationally and 
ate his breakfast well. The court considered the plaintiff's 
allegations in their most favorable light and with a full 
awareness of the strong presumption against the granting of a 
summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the 
motion was properly granted. The court reasoned as follows: 
"Before plaintiff may maintain a cause 
of action, he must establish as a matter of 
law that the defendant had a duty to him. 
The duty in a malpractice case is the duty to 
provide care in accordance with the normal 
standards of the physician, and the standard 
of the care for a specialist is that of a 
reasonable specialist practicing medicine in 
light of present day scientific know-
1 edge • • • • 
"Here, the defendant is a board 
certified orthopedic surgeon who does not 
hold himself out as a specialist in 
psychiatry. It is significant that there was 
no history of mental disorders and suicidal 
attempts by plaintiff at the time of the 
incident. The only indication that there 
could be any trouble were the nurse's notes 
and the nurse's conversation with defendant. 
These indicated that the defendant had had a 
bad night, had been nervous and apprehensive 
and had had some type of hallucination. 
"It is significant, however, that the 
morning nurse indicated that the patient was 
perfectly well oriented and adjusted, and ate 
his breakfast well. It is also significant 
that the defendant suggested to the plaintiff 
that he remain another day, but the plaintiff 
said he felt perfectly fine and wanted to go 
home. 
"The case fails to disclose any legal 
duty of defendant to anticipate tha~ . 
plaintiff would attempt suicide by JU~p1~g 
out of the window. The action of pla1nt1ff 
was totally unpredictable and totally 
unforeseeable. 
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"To hold in this case that defendant had 
a duty to recognize a potential psychiatric 
disorder and take steps to restrain the 
plaintiff extends the duty of defendant far 
beyond any reasonable limits. Were such an 
unreasonable burden placed upon defendant he 
could never safely prescribe any medication 
or release any patient without fear of a 
malpractice action." 
258 N.W.2d at 240-41. 
The appellant's cases are not in point, and may be 
distinguished as follows: 
1. Lexington Hospital, Inc., v. White, 245 S.W.2d 927 
(Ky. App. 1952). In this case the need for restraints was 
striking. The plaintiff had gotten out of the hospital earlier,' 
his paranoid delusions were very apparent. The entire care of 
the patient was turned over to the hospital. The doctors 
involved were hospital principals. 
2. Misfeldt v. Hospital Authority, 101 Ga. App. 579, 
115 S.E.2d 244 (1960). When the doctor called the hospital to 
arrange for a room for the patient he stated that the patient was 
mentally disturbed and that he would like her to have a "psycho 
room". Numerous people testified about the strange appearance 
and the "glary look" in the plaintiff's eyes. Mr. Farrow was not 
admitted as a "psycho" patient. 
3. Kent v. Whitaker, 58 Wash. 2d 569, 364 P.2d 556 
(1961). The plaintiff had attempted suicide just before her 
admission, and the hospital knew it. This was not a malpracti~ 
case. 
4. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital and Medical 
Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193 (1967). This is another 
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case of a mental patient being admitted to a psychiatric ward, 
where there was plenty of warning of a suicidal tendency. 
5. Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 26 Cal.2d 847, 
161 P.2d 556 (1945). In this case there were very definite signs 
of paranoia visible to the nurses. The afternoon shift 
recognized the possibility of restraining the patient but decided 
to leave the matter for the next shift. 
6. Hunt v. King County, 4 Wash. App. 14, 481 P.2d 593 
(1971). This case involved a young man who was admitted to a 
closed psychiatric ward with a history that included (1) drug 
abuse, (2) wildly irrational behavior, (3) chopping up the family 
basement with a hatchet and (4) making homicidal threats. He was 
brought to the hospital in handcuffs and restraints by the 
police, and his father said that he would try any way possible to 
get out. This case was distinguished in May v. Triple C 
Convalescent Centers, 19 Wash. App. 794, 578 P.2d 541 (1978). 
7. Meier v. Ross General Hospital, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 
445 P.2d 519 (1968). In this case the patient was in the 
psychiatric ward after having tried to commit suicide. He jumped 
out of a window that was not locked in any way. 
These cases simply are not relevant to the case at bar 
involving a patient who had been in the hospital for many days, 
who had not made any attempts to escape, who had not indicated to 
any of the nurses that he was suffering from hallucinations, who 
had been seen by a psychiatrist earlier in the evening, who 
seemed to be at ease and relaxed after his visit with the 
psychiatrist, who was talking about going home and about his 
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little girl, and who appeared to be asleep shortly before his 
jump. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to present 
affirmative expert testimony to prove that the hospital or its 
nurses were in some way responsible for Mr. Farrow's jump. 
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POINT IV: THE ONLY ALLEGED BREACH OF STANDARD OF CARE 
OF THIS RESPONDENT FOR WHICH THE APPELLANT HAD 
ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS THE ALLEGED 
FAILURE TO ADMINISTER THE 100 MILLIGRAMS OF 
MELLARIL IMMEDIATELY AFTER 8:00 P,M. ON 
AUGUST 23 
The courts have recognized that in cases involving the 
propriety of the treatment of a patient by a doctor or other 
similar medical personnel, expert testimony is necessary to 
establish liability except where the matter is one of common 
knowledge or where the conduct shows a gross neglect or want of 
care such as leaving medical supplies in the incision of a 
patient. A case in point is Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 
347 P.2d 1108 (1959), where the Court held that the standard of 
care required by a physician for the casting procedure and post-
operative care of a "triple arthrodesis" operation must be 
established by expert medical testimony. 
A case involving the question of the negligence of 
hospital employees is Krause v. Bridgeport Hospital, 362 A.2d 802 
(Conn. Sup. Ct. 1975), wherein the appellate court upheld the 
directed verdict of the trial court, stating that expert 
testimony was necessary to show the negligence of three x-ray 
technicians. Expert testimony was said to be necessary because 
the manipulation required for the proper positioning for a barium 
enema of a patient who was described as tense and obese, was a 
highly technical problem. 
According to the court in Defalco v. Long Island 
College Hospital, 393 N.Y. Supp. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1977): 
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If a hospital employee's acts require 
professional skill and knowledge, however, 
then it is a case of malpractice. To 
establish malpractice by a hospital, expert 
medical testimony must be offered to 
demonstrate that a resident, interne, nurse 
or technician, as the case may be, violated 
some accepted standard of good professional 
practice and injured the patient. 
393 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 864. 
In the instant case, the question of how the nurses on 
the neurosurgical ward should have handled a patient such as the 
plaintiff who, it is claimed, had some unusual mental problems 
was a highly technical matter. To make an informed judgment 00 
the propriety of the conduct of the nurses the jury would ne~ ~ 
have the expert opinions of persons acquainted with such hospit~ 
wards, good nursing care and practice, and the appropriate 
standards of care. This case does not involve simply a matter of 
dropping a patient on the floor or misreading a thermometer. 
The appellant attempts to supply the requisite eleme~s 
of expert testimony by reference to three depositions taken by 
the defendants during discovery. The appellant chose not to 
submit any counter-affidavits and hence, his expert testimony 
must be found, if at all, in its proper form in these 
depositions. 
Rule 56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes 
it clear that opposing affidavits must be made on personal 
knowledge, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence and showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. When the court permits 
affidavits to be opposed by depositions, such depositions must 
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also meet the same standards of personal knowledge, admissibility 
and competency. 
It is interesting to note that the appellant's main 
expert witness, Dr. C. H. Hardin Branch, in a video-taped 
deposition, expressed no opinion concerning the negligence of the 
hospital. The main thrust of his opinion testimony was directed 
toward the defendants Moench and Schricker. 
The appellant sets forth what he terms "an impressive 
catalog of failures and omissions" on the part of the hospital 
{appellant's brief, P. 37-38). As will be shown below, this so-
called catalog is nothing more than a shabby list of wishes. 
The Testimony of Sydney Walker 
The plaintiff attempts to support his claims with the 
deposition of Sydney Walker, a California physician. 
Dr. Walker's testimony in the deposition should not 
have been considered by the court for several reasons. First, 
the plaintiff had no intention, only days before trial, to call 
Dr. Walker as a witness. Mr. Garrett admitted as much in the 
arguments on the motions for summary judgment: 
MR. BUSHNELL: That's correct, the hospita~. 
If the Court please, I would like to address 
my comments first to Dr. Walker and his 
testimony, because we didn't address that in 
our memorandum, and for some very obvious 
reasons: 
One, we are told by Mr. Garrett that they do 
not intend to call him as a witness. And I 
think you reaffirmed that this mornin~, ~r. 
Garrett? You do not intend to have him in? 
MR. GARRETT: 
at this point. 
I do not intend to have him in 
(R. 1189-90). 
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Second, Dr. Walker was not properly qualified to 
testify as to the standard of care of nursing practice that 
should have been followed at the LDS Hospital. The doctor made 
some statements concerning what the nurses should have done, a~ 
yet there is no statement in the record as to how Dr. Walker is 
qualified to testify about the nursing profession. If Dr. Wal~r 
were to appear at trial, his lack of qualification would lead to 
an objection from the defendants concerning the doctor's opinions 
as to nursing care. Such an objection should properly be 
sustained. Although the nursing and doctor professions are 
related, not every doctor is in the position to be an expert in 
the standards of practice of nurses. In fact, it appears froo 
Walker's deposition that he has very little contact with hospital 
at all: 
Q. What hospitals are you on the staff of? 
First of all, are you on the staff of any 
hospital? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which one? 
A. Scripps Memorial, Sharp Memorial, 
Grossmont, Doctors Hospital and Clairemont 
General Hospital. 
Q. Now, is that an active staff membership 
in each of those places? 
A. I would say it was active. I have a very 
limited hospital-based practice. I do visit. 
Q. Are you a Senior member at any 
institution? 
A. I am not. 
Q. What is your status of your membership? 
-36-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Courtesy. 
Q. In all of those that you mentioned? 
A. Yes. 
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 688-90). The testimony 
continues later in the deposition: 
Q. Right at the moment, Doctor, how many 
patients do you have that you are attending 
to in the hospital somewhere? 
A. None. 
Q. And how many have you had this year? 
A. None. 
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 764). 
Dr. Walker, therefore, would have little opportunity to 
associate with the nursing profession, and there is nothing in 
his deposition that qualifies him as an expert in nursing care. 
Moreover, there is no foundation to show that Dr. Walker is 
familiar with the operation and procedures of hospitals in Utah, 
or in similar localities. In fact, Dr. Walker made a rather 
sarcastic reference to practice in Utah when he stated: 
Q. That is your opinion of the medical 
standard of care? 
A. Absolutely. That is the standard of 
care; right. 
Q. Where? 
A. Everywhere. 
Q. Are you sure that that is what it is in 
Utah? 
A. I just testified that I don't know what 
you folks do out there. 
Q. You don't mean everywhere. You don't 
mean Utah because you don't know. 
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A. I hope you understood it, we will exclude 
Utah. 
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 773). 
Even if this lack of foundation were ignored and Dr, 
Walker were allowed to testify, it is clear from his deposition 
that he has nothing bad to say about the nursing care during the 
critical period - after Dr. Moench had visited the plaintiff, • 
testified: 
Q. So my question is: What did the nurses 
do or fail to do between the time Dr. Moench 
was there and the time that the patient went 
out the window? 
A. From the time Dr. Moench was there, I 
guess nothing. 
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 782). 
The appellant makes some reference to a letter that Dr. 
Walker wrote prior to the taking of his deposition. It should be 
clear that such a letter would not be admissible at trial and, 
hence, should not be considered on a motion for summary judg~~. 
Utah law is clear that materials submitted in 
opposition to summary judgments should not be considered if they 
would not be admissible in trial by reason of containing hea~Q. 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 
P.2d 1019 (1972), inadmissible parol evidence, Rainford v. 
Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 41 P.2d 769 (1969), or improper opinion 
testimony, Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah~ 
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). In Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 
436 P.2d 1021 (1968) this Court affirmed a summary judgment for 
the defendant in a slip-and-fa! l case, despite the fact that an 
opposing affidavit setting forth expert testimony was submitted. 
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The Court commented upon the improper foundation for the expert 
testimony as follows: 
Now, in order for an affidavit to be of 
effective use in the determination of a 
motion for summary judgment, it must set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence. • • • The question of the 
similarity of conditions also would be a 
matter to influence the trial judge in 
determining whether the test performed would 
be admissible in evidence. The affidavit 
does not state what type of floor was used in 
the test, whether it was maple, oak, pine, 
covered with linoleum or bare. It would seem 
the test was not competent, and the trial 
judge would not be reversed in ignoring it 
even if it tended to support the allegations 
of plaintiff's complaint which were in issue. 
436 P.2d at 1022. 
This leaves the appellant with only the testimony of 
the nurses, Mary E. Vaughn and Frances Funk. They were listed as 
witnesses for the plaintiff only days before trial. Their 
depositions were taken with the result that neither of them 
expresses competent expert opinions concerning the adequacy of 
nursing care given to the plaintiff with the possible exception 
of the speed with which the "stat" order of 100 milligrams of 
Mellaril was administered. 
The Testimony of Mary Vaughn 
During her deposition, Nurse Vaughn repeatedly 
attempted to avoid expressing her opinion as to whether the 
failure to physically restrain the plaintiff was a violation of 
the standard of care of nurses, although she was obviously 
singling out that particular failure. When finally pinned down, 
however, Nurse Vaughn had to admit that such failure was not a 
breach of the standard of care: 
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Q. • •• Now, would you tell me whether in 
your opinion that is a violation of the 
standard of care not to have put that patient 
under restraint? 
A. I think it would come under there would 
be a lot of oldtime nurses that would take 
that precaution where a lot of younger nurses 
would not, let's put it that way. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Is that fair? 
Q. I think so. I will live with that. So, 
in other words, there is a difference in 
opinion as to what you would do under these 
circumstances? 
A. Yes, there really is. 
Q. And either one could be considered to be 
a proper procedure? 
A. That's right. 
(Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 654). 
Earlier, Mrs. Vaughn had stated that it was "not 
necessarily" a requirement that nurses use restraints on patients 
like the plaintiff (Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 616). Also, 
the other nursing expert, Frances Funk, does not suggest that the 
nurses should have put the plaintiff in restraints assuming, as 
the affidavits reveal, that the psychiatrist had been in at 8:00 
p.m. and that following the visit, the plaintiff was calm, quiet, 
and coherent and was not complaining (Deposition of Frances Fu~. 
R. 584-85). 
Hence, Mrs. Vaughn is saying that in such a situation 
nurses following one school of thought would use restraints but 
nurses following another school would not and that either coune 
of treatment would be acceptable. 
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The case law supports the proposition that in such a 
case the following of the procedures of a respectable school of 
thought does not constitute negligence. For example, the court 
in Sims v. Callahan, 112 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1959), stated: 
The law does not permit a physician to 
be at ~he mercy of testimony of his expert 
competitors, whether they agree with him or 
not. In the case of Jackson v. Burton, 226 
Ala. 483, 485, 147 So. 414, 416, this court 
said: 
"* * * The rule of law under such 
circumstances is that: 'Where there are 
various recognized methods of treatment the 
physician is at liberty to follow the one he 
thinks best, and is not liable for malprac-
tice because expert witnesses give their 
opinion that some other method would have 
been preferable.' •• 
The Testimony of Frances Funk 
Nurse Funk testified that the nurses gave the plaintiff 
only routine care during the night in question. However, it 
should be noted that her opinion as to the care given was based 
solely upon the hospital chart: 
Q. (By Mr. Garrett) In your opinion there 
was nothing given this man other than routine 
care; is that correct? 
A. Routine custodial care. 
MR. BUSHNELL: That is based completely on 
the record, isn't it, that you have seen? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is all I know. 
(Deposit ion of Frances Funk, R. 577). 
She does not know of any conduct of the nurses other 
than what is written in the chart, (Deposition of Frances Funk, 
R. 5 51), and she admits that she does not have any idea how many 
contacts the nu rs es had with the plaintiff because she was not 
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there and had not talked to any of the nurses directly involved 
(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 558-59). 
The hospital chart (Exhibit D-1, P. 209) shows only a 
few of the nursing contacts that were had with the plaintiff 
during the evening and night in question. The affidavits of the 
nursing personnel that were filed with the court with the moti~ 
for summary judgment revealed many other i terns of care that Mrs. 
Funk did not have knowledge of at the time she gave her 
deposition. These affidavits must be assumed to contain true 
statements of additional care for purposes of the motion becauu 
counter-affidavits were not produced under Rule 56 procedures. 
Hence, Mrs. Funk's opinions are based upon inadequate foundation 
and should be rejected. 
Besides, Mrs. Funk's suggestion that only routine ~n 
was given must not have been a reflection upon the compliance of 
the nurses with the proper standard of care, because she states: 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the adequacy 
of the nursing care from the time Dr. Moench 
was there until the patient went out the 
window? 
A. I can't give you an opinion on that. 
(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 559). 
Her approach appears to be that because the plaintiff 
jumped somebody must have been at fault: 
Q. Well, that is kind of a hindsight 
approach, isn't it, Mrs. Funk, and that is 
that any time somebody goes out the window 
then the nurses must have failed? Is that 
what you are saying to me? 
A. Somebody failed. 
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Q. Are you saying it is the nurses that 
failed? 
A. I am not saying it is the nurses. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I am just saying that he wasn't given the 
support that he evidently,needed. 
Q. Okay. But whose fault was that? 
A, I don't know. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whose fault 
it was? 
A. No, I don't. 
(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 560-61). 
Nurses Funk and Vaughn testified that Karen Pool did 
not follow Dr. Moench's order for a "stat" dose of Mellaril when 
she administered the drug about two hours after it was ordered. 
Although Sister M. Carolita Hart, this defendant's expert 
witness, took exception to such an opinion, such an area of 
concern would present a jury issue, but only if the plaintiff had 
expert testimony as to the causal relationship between the 
alleged delay in the administration of the drug and the 
plaintiff's jump. Because the plaintiff had no expert witness as 
to causation, the plaintiff properly was not allowed to take the 
Mellaril question to the jury. 
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POINT V: THE APPELLANT HAS NO EXPERT TESTIMONY TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE ALLEGED DELAY IN ADMINISTERING 
THE MELLARIL OR THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATION OF AN 
INSUFFICIENT DOSE OF MELLARIL OR ANY OTHER ALLEGED 
OMISSION WAS THE CAUSE OF THE APPELLANT'S JUMP ..__ 
The causal relationship in a medical malpractice case 
must be established by expert testimony, except in those cases 
where the causation is obvious. A case in point is Huggins v. 
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957), which involved the 
post-operative care of a gall bladder operation. The trial court 
set aside a verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment n.o.v, 
dismissing the action. This Court held that the evidence was 
insufficient to present a jury question as to whether the doctor 
breached the standard of care of doctors in the community or as 
to the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries. The 
Court noted that the post-operative care of the gall bladder 
operation depends upon complex scientific knowledge and cannot be 
ascertained by common lay knowledge and that both the standard of 
care and the proximate causation require expert testimony. On 
proximate causation, the Court stated: 
As a general rule in a malpractice action, 
expert testimony must be produced to show 
that the injuries alleged were probably 
caused by the lack of due care of defendant. 
In the absence of such evidence, there is 
nothing upon which a jury can base its 
findings on the proximate cause of the 
injury. The evidence must be substantial and 
must, in cases of this complex type, have 
foundation in expert medical testimony. 
310 P.2d at 526. 
-4 4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Without expert testimony as to causation, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, because without such testimony, 
the action must fail and other fact issues can have no effect. A 
case in point is Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 545 P.2d 
670 (Mont. 1976), wherein the court held that even if all other 
factual issues were determined in favor of the plaintiffs, there 
would be no genuine issue of material fact without the requisite 
expert testimony. 
Another case in point is Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 
542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975), where the court stated that expert 
testimony is required to show whether the plaintiff's difficulty 
from the first operation was more probably than not the result of 
negligence. This is a case where the court granted summary 
judgment. 
Similarly, in Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 46 Ill. 
App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964), the court sustained a 
directed verdict because no expert evidence was introduced to 
show that causalgia was the result of the injection in that case. 
And in DeFalco v. Long Island College Hospital, 393 
N.Y. Supp. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1977), the court set aside a jury 
verdict because expert testimony was lacking on the causation 
between the alleged poor nursing practice and the loss of the 
plaintiff's eye. According to the court: 
Nevertheless, such an obviously unsanitary 
procedure lacked the requisite expert 
testimony to prove that the presumably 
unsterile eye patch carried enterobacter and 
staph albus germs from the floo7 to t~e 
plaintiff's eye and caused the infection. 
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There was no evidence that the presumably 
soiled bandage was the cause of the 
infection. Causal connection between the 
nurse's act and the plaintiff's injury was 
not established by competent medical testi-
mony 
393 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 865. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, the plaintiff needed to 
produce expert testimony to the effect that the alleged lack of 
due care by the hospital nurses was the cause of Mr. Farrow's 
jump from his window. This subject has to do with the inner 
workings of the mind of the patient and how his thought processu 
might have been altered by different conduct of the nurses. 
Hence, a lay jury, untrained in a knowledge of psychiatry, 
pharmacology and other related subjects, cannot fairly reach a 
judgment on the causation issue without expert advice. 
None of the plaintiff's expert witnesses can or did 
state that any of the alleged omissions of the nurses was the 
cause of Mr. Farrow's jump. Specifically, Nurses Funk and Vaughn 
were asked whether the alleged delay in the administration of 
Mellaril caused the plaintiff to jump from his window. Their 
answers were similar: 
Q. I am now asking about the effect. We 
have gone through stat and I am talking about 
the effect if it had been given earlier -
stat - as early as you said it should have 
been, and if an orderly had run right down 
and given it to him, you are not now saying 
that the failure to give it to him at that 
time was the cause for him to go out the 
window, are you? 
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A. I am not saying because I am not a 
pharmacist, because .I don't know that much 
about drugs, but I don't think it would have 
mattered. 
(Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 672). 
Q. But when you say if it would have been 
given immediately, let's say that it was 
given at 8:30, a:e you presuming that, say, 
if it had been given to him at 8:30 that 
would have made a difference in Mr. Farrow's 
conduct that night? 
A. Well, if it hadn't made a difference, I 
don't see why he wrote "stat". 
Q. The answer is you don't know what 
difference it would have made; isn't that 
true? 
A. I don't know. 
(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 594). 
This respondent submitted the affidavits of three 
medical expert witnesses under Rule 56, each of which states that 
the delay, if any, in administering the Mellaril was not the 
cause of the plaintiff's jump. The affidavit of Bruce A. Walter, 
Deputy Director of Health for the State of Utah is typical: 
The drug "Mellaril" has its peak calming 
effect within 1.25 to four hours after 
administration. Therefore, if Karen Pool 
administered the Mellaril to Mr. Farrow 10:00 
p.m. on August 23, it would have reached its 
peak effect before 2:40 a.m. on August 24, at 
which time, I have been informed, Mr. Farrow 
jumped. Hence, it is my opinion to a 
reasonable medical certainty that any delay 
in administering Mellaril was not a 
contributing factor in Mr. Farrow's decision 
to jump from his window, all other events or 
conditions remaining the same. 
(Affidavit of Bruce Alexander Walter, paragraph 9, R. 295). To 
the same effect are the affidavits of Sister M. Carolita Hart 
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(paragraph Ge, R. 237) and Doctor Charles R. Smart (paragraph 10 
R. 232). 
Because the appellant failed to submit counter 
affidavits pursuant to the Rule 56 procedure, he had no expert 
testimony as to the cause of his injuries, and this respondent 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the area of medical malpractice this Court has held 
in several cases, including Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 
347, P.2d 1108 (1959), that the standard of care required by the 
defendant must be established by expert testimony unless the 
matter is one of common knowledge. Because this case involves 
complex knowledge in the fields of surgery, psychiatry and 
pharmacology, expert testimony is a must. 
In only one area, the administration of Mellaril, did 
the plaintiff even arguably have such testimony. However, in 
that area, the plaintiff had no expert testimony that the alleged 
delay in administering the Mellaril or the alleged improper dose 
of Mellaril was the cause of the plaintiff's jump. Without such 
expert testimony on causation in a medical malpractice case, the 
plaintiff has no case. Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 
P.2d 523 (1957). 
This respondent submitted the affidavits of three 
medical expert witnesses stating that the alleged delay in 
administering Mellaril to the plaintiff was not the cause of the 
plaintiff's jump. The plaintiff failed to respond with opposing 
affidavits or other submissions under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and he was properly not allowed to proceed to 
trial against this respondent. 
Without the requisite expert testimony, the plaintiff 
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that would 
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preclude summary judgment. Shoberg v. Kelly, 1 Wash. App. 673, 
466 P.2d 280 (1969). 
It is submitted that the respondent, Health Services 
Corporation, was properly relieved of the burden of a protracted 
trial when it was clear that the plaintiff could not possibly 
make a case against it. We respectfully request the Court to 
affirm the summary judgment below. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1978. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE 
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-CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING CHESTER E. FARROW 
LDS Hospital, Aug. 23-24, 1974 
4 p.m. 23-(Callahan takes vital signs 
Callahan says Farrow receives drinking water 
5 p.m. 
6 p.m. Gr~ff~ths talks to Farrow for hour on patio; 
Griffiths notes Farrow more oriented than other 
times; Callahan says meal taken in; 
Later empty tray removed after Farrow eats 
7 p.m. 151111-.~~-LCallahan says Farrow receives drinking water 
8:30 
Dr. Moench visits with Farrow in room 
Callahan takes vital signs 
Pool says Dr. Moench instructs on medications and 
tells of hallucinations; Pool reads consult note 
and discusses matter with shift personnel 
General Observations of Afternoon Shift (4-11:30 p.m.) Aug. 23 : 
Pool - "Several contacts" during shift; Farrow calm, quiet, 
rational; No hallucinations noted 
Callahan - Personally visited Farrow at least once an hour; 
Conversations with Farrow about going home and his 
little girl; Conversations made him feel better; 
Had conversation about city lights; Farrow well 
oriented, coherent, calm, relaxed; No mention of 
voices 
Peterson - Talked with Farrow on "numerous occasions" -
probably "4 or 5 times"; No voices mentioned 
9 p.m. 
11: 45 
Callahan gives "HS Care" - may have involved more 
than one visit; Farrow quiet and well oriented; 
Farrow accepts back rub and responds well to 
conversation about going home and little girl; 
Callahan cleans room and talks and prepares Farrow 
for bed 
Pool gives Farrow 100 mg. of mellaril 
Callahan says Farrow has routine check before end 
of shift 
Pool reports to Karren and Hall about (1) Moench 
request to observe Farrow; (2) Farrow allowed up 
and around; (3) New medications; (4) Farrow had been 
quiet, calm, and resting - no probl7ms 
12 a.m.~Aug 24 Hall visits Farrow, in bed and resting; Farrow.says 
l nothing needed; H~ll inst:ucts on using call light and says to call if anything nee~ed; Farrow. rational and coherent; No complaints; No voices 
1 a.m.}-[ 
Karren 
l: 30 quiet; 
checks Farrow; Room dark and Farrow still and 
Karren believes Farrow asleep and leavese 
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